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Akeel Bilgrami
Freedom versus 
Accountability in the 
Academy
the question of freedom of inquiry has been in the air, no doubt, 
ever since human inquiry began in any systematic way. But institutions 
of learning face the question in a rather more specific form since, on 
the one hand, they may claim to be uniquely privileged in possessing 
such freedom because inquiry itself is their most central function, yet 
on the other hand, they may be host to constraints on freedom that are 
necessitated by the institutional protocols that academies, as sites that 
combine both pedagogy and research, must adopt.
Academic freedom has had a long and complex evolution, and 
that complexity owes to a wide variety of factors, some from changes 
of the culture within academic institutions and some from conditions 
in the mundiality of the world at large—whether political, economic, 
technological, or ideological—since such institutions are no longer 
(perhaps never were) sealed as cloisters. Though it might seem that 
the issues faced by Galileo in Europe were in essence no different 
from those faced by proponents of Darwin’s ideas today in the Ameri-
can heartland, it would be obtuse to consider that essence as some-
thing unaffected by the tremendously large changes in the polity, the 
state, the law, the church, and the mentalities of ordinary people. 
That much is obvious given the vast distance of time and space be-
tween Renaissance Europe and contemporary America. But often the 
context of discussions of freedom of inquiry can change much more 
locally and within a very few years, and yet carry a vast conceptual 
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transformation in what the central issues are. I want to focus on one 
such local and very recent change in American universities, and con-
sider what I believe is a really quite novel development in the entire 
question of academic freedom. It has been the subject of intense de-
bate on campuses in the past couple of years, with cool heads increas-
ingly gone missing on both sides.
Before I address the dispute itself and come to one large conclu-
sion about it at the end of this short essay, it may be worth first briefly 
expounding how the dispute has emerged against a background of 
political developments in the wider social and political context and 
their curricular and ideological effects on American universities. This 
story may be utterly familiar, but it bears retelling, if only to put into 
context the particular cast and character of the contemporary dispute 
I want to focus on.
the creative turmoil of the universities in the 1960s to a 
considerable extent emerged out of a broadly conceived Left poli-
tics among students, initially reacting to the draft and, therefore, 
highly critical of the government’s misadventures in Southeast Asia, 
but then often going on to derive that criticism from a wider and 
more fundamental Left critique of capitalism and its effects both on 
American society and distant nations. Racial politics ran parallel to 
this mobilization on campuses and, as we know, produced one of the 
more remarkable pieces of legislation in American history.
I say that it ran “parallel” to the Left politics on campuses ini-
tially triggered by the war in Vietnam, but I don’t want to give the 
impression by that term that they were merely contingently or mis-
cellaneously related. An ethos in which racial issues were raised in 
tandem with conspicuously Left-based mobilizations gave the poli-
tics of race a very specific complexion in that decade. Its focus was 
primarily on a struggle to acquire rights hitherto unpossessed by a 
group defined upon a racial identity, and that political focus did not 
get dispersed to a more broadly cultural racial politics as it did in the 
decades that followed, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, and which 
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came to be described as “identity” politics. This is a point of some 
significance, and something like this initial restricted political focus 
dispersing to a broader cultural canvas is also perhaps true of the 
trajectory of feminist politics from those earlier decades of the 1960s 
and 1970s to the later decades of the past century.
This is not the occasion to make clear or rigorous what is 
meant by the term “identity” in the expression “identity politics,” 
but what I do want to stress is that the interest in that expression, 
however hazy its meaning, derives from a political critique of the 
perceived limitations of the earlier political radicalism of the Left. Let 
me trample with great big boots on a lot of subtle distinctions and 
details—given the restrictions of space, there is no avoiding this—
and summarily say that this critique pushed further a criticism that 
the earlier Leftists had made against the complacencies of liberal uni-
versalism, which they felt prevailed in the academic establishment. 
Such a universalism was said to hide the deep class distinctions that a 
capitalist society had generated—and the later emergence of identity 
politics sought to locate a similar complacence in the prevalent con-
viction among the Left that the only fundamental identity was class 
identity, dismissing all other identities as in one way or another paro-
chializing what should be the more fundamental struggle against the 
destructive tendencies of capital. The identitarians shared with the 
Left a rejection of the Enlightenment’s liberal legacy in its prevalent 
orthodox forms, but it insisted that there were forms of disrespect 
and hatred that had their source in distinctions other than class and 
material difference, had their source in race, gender, ethnicity, caste, 
and other such forms of difference. Difference itself, it was argued, 
must now become a subject of cultural study, over and above a mere 
struggle for political rights and material improvement, and diversity 
of identities must be acknowledged as intrinsically worthy, so as to 
restore dignity and autonomy to groups who had been the target of 
centuries of cultural contempt over and above material deprivation 
and exploitation.
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This critique caught fire on American campuses, introducing 
curricular trends and innovations in the social sciences and especially 
the humanities, and the faculty in these disciplines led the charge, 
often dismissing more traditional scholars as out of date not only in 
their thinking but in their frameworks of thinking, something that 
could only be corrected if the syllabi and the pedagogical techniques 
in these subjects were radically transformed. The old guard often 
turned defensive in the face of these changes and dug its heels in. 
“Culture wars” was the term by which such disputation came to be 
described.
Who was right? It would be impossible (and unsuitable) even to 
try to adjudicate this question in detail in a short essay of this kind, 
though looking back on it now from some distance, it does seem as if 
there was right on both sides. On the one hand, the insistence by the 
traditional Left on the fundamental nature of class was often wrongly 
wielded to deny the significance of identity politics and the ameliora-
tions it sought (and to a considerable extent achieved over these later 
decades) against a longstanding culture of, at worst, contempt for 
certain minorities (women counted as minorities in status if not in 
numbers) and, at best, insouciance regarding their marginalization. 
But, on the other hand, the Left’s claim has real merit in the follow-
ing sense at least, a sense perfectly compatible with the acknowledge-
ment of the right that may also be found in identity politics and these 
ameliorations it sought and achieved. The Left could surely rightly 
claim that the ameliorations that were sought and achieved by iden-
tity politics, however justified they were, would never have been al-
lowed if they had in any deep way undermined the domination of 
capital (or to put it less abstractly, the deep and widespread influ-
ence of corporations in shaping American society). If this speculation 
is right—which, on the face of it, it does seem to be—then there is 
surely some justification to the claim that class identity is, after all, 
more fundamental than the other identities that identity politics put 
on center stage.
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This ecumenical understanding of the rightness and wrong-
ness of the two sides of this dispute was not, however, how things 
actually played out. There is little doubt that the identitarians won 
the dispute on the campuses of the nation. As a result, a good deal of 
the curriculum in a range of disciplines—as well as what got counted 
as important and what was deemed irrelevant and arcane or harmful 
in intellectual inquiry—was reshaped over these years. Some of this 
was very worthwhile, though there was much justifiable resentment 
sometimes at the extent of the reshaping in some subjects and at the 
disdain for the old guard, a sort of mirror image of the frustration felt 
by those excluded and dismissed when fundamental identity issues 
were for so long simply not on the horizon of discussion. The iden-
titarians’ victory also had significant effects on the cultural ethos in 
universities, often for the better, for instance—to mention just one 
example—by reducing the unreflective sexism on the part of faculty 
members not only in their relations with one another but in their re-
lations with students, both in and outside classrooms. In fact, so wide 
was the victory, that the very term “Left” came now to be owned by 
identity politics, and the traditional Left began to be described as just 
that—with the ineliminable dismissive qualifier, “traditional.”
I am keen to highlight this entire background and pedigree for 
the current dispute partly because I want to stress that this identitar-
ian critique of liberal universalism as well as the traditional Left was 
primarily mobilized by the faculty of the humanities and the social 
sciences, and its initial battleground was intellectual and curricular 
more than social and political, though the fallout of its triumph, as 
I said, was to reshape the cultural ethos of classroom and campus 
life. But then, looking more closely at the most recent years, once 
this fallout of the recent past came to be settled in place over these 
decades, the entire identitarian point of view came to be increasingly 
owned by students, not faculty. In fact, what we are witnessing today 
in the contemporary dispute I want to focus on (now that I’ve retold 
its historical background in potted form) is an interesting retreat of 
the faculty from some of the new developments around the identity 
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politics of diversity and difference that students on campuses have 
adopted, in particular from recent efforts on the part of students to 
put constraints of accountability on freedom in the academy, con-
straints arising out of (the surely salutary) commitment that universi-
ties have adopted in the past few decades to the value of diversity and 
difference.
what, then, is the current dispute? the problem, as we face it, 
seems to be this: the commitment to diversity and difference that 
came to pass as a result of the developments over the past few decades 
(which I have tried to crudely sketch) has generated a wide variety 
of demands, mostly from students—such as the curbing, with sanc-
tions, of the incivility of aggressive hate-mongering speech and even 
the many “microagressions,” as they are called, that lie just below 
the surface of seemingly civil speech and cause offense to particular 
groups; such as the creation of safe spaces for minority and even 
women students facing an insensitive and complacent majoritar-
ian and male ethos; such as the requirement of trigger warnings in 
the classroom when teaching texts containing material that might 
offend particular groups (descriptions of rape or of brutal treatment 
of African-Americans in the South, for instance); and so on.
Those are the demands on one side. On the other side, there is 
the claim that all these demands are either direct threats to freedom 
of speech or create an ethos of inhibition of free and open inquiry, 
discouraging the full expression of the voices and personalities of free 
inquirers to pursue controversial paths of inquiry that have in the 
past frequently yielded new and fruitful forms of knowledge. And 
since the pursuit and transmission of knowledge is the chief mission 
of institutions of higher learning, such inhibitions are particularly 
unwelcome in such institutions.
Let me begin by putting aside one sort of person on each side 
of this dispute who I think does not deserve to be taken seriously. On 
the side of free speech, I am not going to consider the sort of person 
I actually find contemptible, who is brazenly inconsistent in champi-
Freedom versus Accountability in the Academy  623
oning free speech. I myself know a few such people who, for instance, 
express high indignation about the threats to free speech that come 
from what they describe as the “political correctness” that pervades 
campuses deriving from ideas of diversity and the acknowledgement 
of historically oppressed minorities, but then are quite prepared to 
ignore the value of free speech when it comes to the expression of 
criticism of Israeli government policies toward the Palestinians and 
the American government’s support for such policies. It is obvious 
that these are people who do not care to protect free speech; they 
only care to protect the speech that they politically favor. As I said: 
contemptible.
On the side of diversity, I am not going to consider the sort of 
person who simply subscribes to the politics of identity and differ-
ence as a reflex, following a trend that is widely in the air, pursuing 
diversity more out of a sense of not wanting to go against the cur-
rent political fashion, rather than out of a genuinely compassionate 
conviction for the sensitivities of disadvantaged groups in our midst. 
The pejorative term “politically correct” is a good description of such 
people, and as a term it should be restricted to describing them in 
particular, not the general politics that recognizes the importance of 
diversity, which—when it is genuine rather than merely a reflex—is 
a humane and worthy form of politics. I should admit that I particu-
larly mention and dismiss such people because I fear I might, as a cal-
low youth, have in some small portion been such a person with just 
such a tendency to unreflectively follow trends—not regarding issues 
of diversity, but on issues that motivated the more “traditional” Left 
in the late 1960s.
Putting aside, then, these contemptible or shallow ways of sub-
scribing to the positions on one or other side of the conflict between 
freedom and diversity, what shall we say of the conflict itself ?
Here, first, are some elementary sociological observations. As 
I have already hinted above, the first and obvious thing to notice is 
that it is the younger generations on campus, the students, who are 
on the side of diversity and are prepared to forgo free speech when-
624  social research
ever speech expresses hate and causes offense. Though there are no 
doubt many faculty (after all, if my remarks setting the background 
are right, it is the faculty who had generated the underlying politics 
for these demands) and administrators who are on that side of the 
dispute and many students on the side of free speech, the older and 
younger generations by and large do distribute differently, with the 
former more clearly and insistently, and in larger numbers, on the 
side of free speech trumping the demands coming from the politics 
of identity and diversity.
The historical reasons for this are not hard to find. For all the 
commitment of some faculty to identitarian ideals in the 1980s and 
1990s, the older generations on campus today grew up in the shadow 
and legacy of McCarthyism, and even after McCarthyism subsided 
they experienced the inhibitions on certain kinds of left-wing speech 
and expression during the long Cold War. It is a reaction to this ex-
perience that shapes much of their (I should say “our” since I am 
part of that generation) deep commitment to free speech. But for the 
younger generation, the students on our campuses today, all this is 
lost in the mists of what seems like ancient history. It is certainly 
not what centrally shapes their experience as it did for us, and so for 
them there is no such historical ground on which free speech seems 
to stand with the same compelling centrality. What they grew up on 
is a quite different kind of politics, a politics of identity battling the 
complacence of standard liberal universalist ideas that, as I put it ear-
lier, dismissed identities as parochializing sites of mobilization; and 
even battling traditional Left politics that, to also repeat, recognized 
no forms of disrespect that did not owe to class differences, often 
explicitly downplaying the disrespect that owed to difference of race 
and gender, and in my own country, the difference of caste in particu-
lar. These battles have reared in them the sensitivities that they want 
respected even if it means putting aside the protections of freedom 
of speech.
There is a further element of their experience that fortifies 
this. They were born into a social setting where social encounters are 
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by no means restricted to face-to-face (or voice-to-voice telephonic) 
conversations. The Internet, in which they participate with far great-
er relish and ease than the older generations do, has undoubtedly 
increased the freedom with which speech can be aired. But, at the 
same time, the Internet—precisely because it is the site of conver-
sations and eavesdropping on conversations that are not only not 
face-to-face but are frequently with anonymous interlocutors—can 
generate a form of abusive discourse on sensitive matters without 
identification of the agent behind it. As a result, the younger gen-
erations—too remote from the history of McCarthyism and the Cold 
War to see what is so ultimately compelling about free speech for the 
older generation—actually associate free speech with the boundless possi-
bilities of abuse and offense that its exercise can make possible on the 
electronic social sites that dominate their social orbit. It is hardly sur-
prising, therefore, that they can quite easily place free speech second 
when it clashes with what they feel much more strongly about—the 
importance of the dignities long under threat by social biases of race, 
gender, ethnicity, and so on.
so much for the sociology of such disputation. how shall we, 
then, think of its effect on the nature of knowledge and inquiry, espe-
cially in the humanities, where these demands and sensitivities are 
most present?
I’d like to recklessly make a bold proposal, which needs much 
qualification that I will not pursue in detail here, so I must apologize 
for the broad stroke with which I have to make it. I’d like to suggest 
that what many of the students are seeking—in their desire to put 
constraints on liberty or autonomy from this perspective of greater 
accountability—is a model of inquiry in the humanities that is closer 
to the ideal of what happens in inquiry in the law, especially criminal 
law. This is not how they or anyone else has put it, as far as I know, 
but it does seem to be implied by the sorts of demands they have 
made. Let me explain what I mean by “inquiry in the law, especially 
criminal law.”
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Take the instruction given to jurors that a defendant must be 
presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. On the face of it, this seems the wrong instruction to give 
someone who is in charge of making an inquiry. The usual instruc-
tion in inquiry is: keep an open mind. If in inquiry one makes a pre-
sumption on one side, then the presumption might cause one to be 
skeptical of the evidence that is presented by the other side. Why, 
then, does the juror not get the instruction to keep an open mind 
instead of presumption of innocence? The answer, ultimately, lies 
with some sense that there are prevailing and submerged prejudices 
that need to be countered. On the practical side, there is the obvious 
prejudice that ordinary people tend to be swayed by those in power 
and authority (just think of the Milgram experiments), and it is more 
usual to find prosecutors (rather than the defense) relying on those 
in power and authority (though criminal cases regarding police bru-
tality are one large exception to this). On the cognitive side, there is 
the prejudice of thinking that if a charge has been brought against 
someone, there must be something to it, a prejudice often expressed 
by the cliché “where there’s smoke there’s fire.” So, to combat these 
prejudices, an instruction of presumption of innocence puts certain 
normative constraints on inquiry. And this entire constraining model 
for inquiry carries over in detail to how evidence may be gathered, 
indeed, even to what constitutes admissible evidence and what does 
not, what may be said by the witness and what must be struck from 
what is said, and so on.
What does this model of inquiry in the law contrast with? Most 
obviously it contrasts with a longstanding ideal of scientific inquiry 
(if Thomas Kuhn is right, more honored in the breach than in the 
observance) where there are supposed to be no such constraints. You 
gather whatever you can gather in coming to and testing scientific 
hypotheses in whatever way you feasibly can. In saying this, I am of 
course not denying that in the last few decades constraints have come 
from animal rights concerns about testing in laboratories, nor am I 
denying that there are many experiments that simply cannot be per-
formed on human beings for obvious reasons; and, to repeat, there 
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are also the subtler constraints that Kuhn described as the unspoken 
prejudices of orthodoxy or of what he called “normal science.” De-
spite all this, what is traditionally considered exemplary in the natu-
ral sciences is inquiry that is as unfettered as is possible—that is, to 
proceed without any ex ante and built-in constraints. But criminal law 
practice as it has evolved would not be criminal law practice if the 
constraints I mentioned were not ex ante built into what we conceive 
inquiry and investigation in the law to be. And students today are 
increasingly claiming, I think, that inquiry in the humanities is like 
inquiry modeled in this way on criminal law rather than as in sci-
ence. (It is worth noting that historically, until late in the eighteenth 
century, evidence law was also governed by the refusal of roadblocks 
placed in the path of inquiry into evidence. It is only when trials and 
defense lawyers began to be the norm, and when the adversarial sys-
tem settled deeply in, that issues of fairness became central and con-
straining of investigation.)
In methodological debates among scholars in the humanities, 
the ideal of scientific inquiry has been questioned at least since We-
ber, and then Dilthey, and then through the entire verstehen tradi-
tion. But the familiar issues there had to do with the fact that there 
is a more interpretative perspective at work in the humanities rather 
than explanatory hypothesis-construction as in the sciences. That is 
not exactly what the students’ demands are seeking today; nor are 
they pointing to the other familiar element of humanistic study that 
contrasts with science—that its objects of study, unlike the objects of 
natural scientific study, are much more pervasively laden with value. 
The idea is not, or not merely, to say that the subject matter of the 
humanities is value-laden but rather that the responses we have to 
that value-laden subject matter may turn on sensitivities that have 
been sharpened by a greater awareness of the importance of diversity 
than hitherto existed in our societies with their widespread preju-
dices against what is anomalous and unconventional, not to mention 
majoritarian prejudice or, at the very least, majoritarian complacence 
in society at large. Thus, just as with criminal law, it is in order to cor-
rect preexisting prejudice owing to one or other social or historical 
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factor that a sort of analogue to due process is demanded in inquiry 
and pedagogy. So the model of inquiry that I am suggesting is being 
sought by the young in the past few years is not just a replacement 
of the scientific model with a more interpretative and value-laden 
model of inquiry of the verstehen and hermeneutical traditions, but 
the quite different model of criminal law with its form of constraints 
of accountability on the processes and the articulations of the out-
comes of investigation.
All this, I believe, is a relatively new development on the meth-
odological horizon of scholarly knowledge and inquiry. Is it a healthy 
development? Is it the right model for inquiry in the humanities? 
Though I have views, some even rather strong views, on the matter, 
I won’t in a short opinion essay say much by way of response to this 
question, even as I think it is a question that will become increasingly 
important to explore and address.
But I will say this. Assuming for the sake of argument that what 
I have said is more or less right, let me close by adding one nuance to 
the proposal that might help to deflate some of the anxieties it prima 
facie gives rise to. Suppose it were the case that we decided to take se-
riously this new “criminal law” model for how to think about inquiry 
in the humanities that seems to have emerged from the demands of 
the younger generation on our campuses. I would think that the first 
thing to notice is that even in criminal law there is more than one 
way to understand the sorts of constraints that it places on inquiry 
and its outcomes and their expression.
In the past several decades, ever since the outreach of the law 
into the realm of transitional justice, the possibilities of a quite new 
model of inquiry emerged even within criminal law. This new model 
sometimes even puts aside the very ideal of forensic justice because 
the aspiration—where transitional justice is concerned—is that one 
must live in the future side by side with the people one was judging; more-
over, much of their crime was not merely active or explicit on the 
part of a few but complicit on the part of large numbers in the popu-
lation. Forensic investigation was therefore beside the point; it actu-
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ally undermined this idea of engaging with the people one had to live 
with, even as one judged them. How did it undermine that? Forensic 
investigation is a detached or disengaged form of inquiry, whereas the 
need was to engage with the accused and the adversary, not simply see 
them in objective terms of evidence.
All of this has deep relevance to the academy, and even if we 
were to take criminal law as a model for how to understand human-
istic inquiry, even if we were to accept the increasing adversarial and 
accusatory ethos on university campuses, the thought cries out that 
it is a model of criminal law that emphasizes engagement rather than 
the detachment of forensics that better fits inquiry in the humanities.
But if that is so, then it is not clear that the constraints of ac-
countability that the young seek today can be seen—even by them—as 
posing any kind of threat to the liberty that has traditionally been 
cherished in inquiry. The reason for this is quite straightforward. One 
can only engage, even with one’s adversary, if one is prepared to hear 
their claims, and for that one has to give them the freedom and au-
tonomy to inquire and to speak the deliverances of their inquiry so 
that we might hear it and engage with it. That notion of engagement 
is what the transitional cases of justice introduced into the criminal 
law, the refusal to treat the subjects of judgment as objects by see-
ing them in purely disengaged or detached terms, silenced targets of 
investigation sitting in the dock. If the model of criminal law that is 
emerging for humanistic inquiry understands itself along these lines, 
modeled on the transitional rather than the forensic exemplar, a 
whole sea of controversy that is expressed in the anxious dichotomy 
of my title—“freedom versus accountability”—can subside. There is 
right on each side; that is to say, even if there is right in the demands 
that push us toward modeling humanistic inquiry on the law rather 
than as in science, a proper understanding of that model of criminal 
law, as it is relevant to the humanities, would allow for autonomy 
and liberty—though now liberty would be legitimated not by clichés 
regarding the “marketplace of ideas” but on grounds that link the law 
itself to a less detached and more engaged understanding of itself and 
its processes of inquiry.
